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Kant, Kierkegaard, James and Evans have four different accounts of belief which 
are never compared or carefully analyzed (i.e., an occurrent notion, a strong 
volitional notion wherein every belief is volitionally acquired, a behavioral notion 
and Price's dispositional notion). Until we are clear on what belief is it is difficult 
to know how it relates to action. 
The Concept of God: An Exploration of Contemporary Difficulties with the 
Attributes of God, by Ronald H. Nash. Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing 
House, 1983. Pp. 127. 
Reviewed by CLEMENT DORE, Vanderbilt University. 
Professor Nash's book is, on the whole, a clearly written, helpful introduction 
to contemporary discussions of the nature of God. It will be of particular value 
for those who are not well acquainted with recent literature on the subject; but 
it will also be of use to those "analytic" religionists who have paid scant attention 
to process theology: Nash discusses the differences between process theologians 
and contemporary Thomists at length. 
I have some reservations about the book, three of the most substantive of 
which I will now mention. 
Nash appears to be presenting us on p. 17 with an actualist account of possible 
worlds, on which any individual in another possible world is identical with an 
individual in the actual world (though, of course, different in some respects). 
But surely, e.g., dragons exist in some possible worlds; and it looks as if it is 
in principle impossible adequately to specify individuals in the actual world who 
are identical with them. If the actualist chooses to claim that every individual 
in the actual world is a possible dragon, then the reply is that it is possible for 
there to be a larger number of dragons than there are individuals in the actual 
world. And similar considerations apply to the actualist claim that it is, e.g., 
actual reptiles (actual flame throwers, etc.) which might have been dragons. 
A more fund~mental problem is that actualism renders modal arguments for 
God's existence question-begging. If every individual which exists in a possible 
world is identical with an actual individual, then claiming that God exists in a 
possible world (or, borrowing from Plantinga, that there is a possible world in 
which maximality is exemplified) is eo ipso claiming that God exists in the actual 
world. So the possibility premiss, which is indispensable in all modal arguments 
for God's existence, would be, in those contexts, as good a candidate for being 
question-begging as any skeptic might desire, in the absence of a more extensive 
defense of it than modal arguers generally provide. 
It is, of course, true that, in order to establish that God exists in all his 
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supremacy in the actual world, the modal arguer requires the further premiss 
that it is a necessary truth that if God exists, then he is maximally perfect in 
every world in which he exists. But that does not block the charge of question-beg-
ging against the actualist who claims that, since God exists in a possible world, 
he exists, in some fashion or other, in the actual world. 
On pp. 65-66, Nash cites favorably Aquinas' approach to the problem of how 
human beings can do other than they do, even though God, in his omniscience, 
has known from all eternity what they would do. What Aquinas says in effect 
about this problem is that though the sentence, "If God knows that S will do A, 
then S will ,do A", expresses a necessary truth, it does not follow that the 
sentence, "If God knows that S will do A, then S will necessarily do A", also 
expresses a necessary truth or, indeed, that it expresses a truth of any kind. 
Nash appears to think that people who are worried about the problem of God's 
foreknowledge and human freedom are simply misplacing a modal operator. 
("Necessarly, if God knows that p, then p", which expresses a necessary truth, 
does not entail "If God knows that p, then necessarily p.") But in fact the problem 
is not so easily solved. For it can be formulated without the commission of any 
such fallacy. Suppose that God knew in 1930 that "Dore will write a review of 
Nash's book in May of 1984" expressed a true proposition. And suppose that it 
is now May of 1984 and I have it in my power to refrain from writing such a 
review. But now if I refrain, then not only did "Dore will write the review in 
May of 1984" express a truth in 1930 but "Dore will not write the review in 
May of 1984" did so as well. Hence, given God's foreknowledge, my having 
it in my power not to write the review is eo ipso my having it in my power to 
bring it about that two contradictory propositions are both true. (And, of course, 
we can generalize: For any action about which God knew that a person would 
do it, the latter has it in his power to refrain from doing it only if he has it in 
his power to make two contradictory propositions true.) 
An alternative conclusion is that, even though it was true in 1930 that God 
knew then that I would not refrain from writing this review, I now have it in 
my power to bring it about that God did not know that in 1930. But this conclusion 
is surely as unpalatable as the former one. 
I should point out here that I am not endorsing the envisaged argument for 
predestination, but rather maintaining that the problem of divine (and, indeed, 
human) foreknowledge and human freedom is more intractable than Nash appears 
to realize. 
There are two further criticisms of Nash's approach to God's foreknowledge: 
(1) Nash says on p. 66 that "given that God is essentially omniscient", the 
sentence, "Whatever God knows is true", expresses a necessary truth. But God's 
being essentially omniscient is not a necessary condition of the envisaged sentence 
expressing a necessary truth. I am not essentially omniscient, but, in view of 
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the meaning of "knows", "Whatever Dore knows is true" also expresses a neces-
sary truth. (2) Nash nowhere indicates that theological fatalism is not the only 
kind of fatalism. Suppose that no one knew in 1930 that "Dore will write a 
review of Nash's book in May of 1984" expressed a truth. Still, the proposition 
which it expresses was in fact true. And this provides the non-theological fatalist 
with as firm a foundation as the theological fatalist can lay claim to. My having 
it in my power to refrain from performing the envisaged action looks like my 
having it in my power either to make two contradictory propositions true or to 
render what was true in 1930 no longer true in 1930. 
Finally, I do not think that Nash always succeeds in making clear just why 
there is a particular problem about God's nature. For example, we find on p. 
104 that "While human beings normally come to have knowledge about other 
persons in a passive way (by being acted upon causally), this avenue of knowledge 
is clearly out of the question (for Thomists)." And Nash subsequently accepts 
the Thomistic claim that God is absolutely causally independent of other beings. 
But, we are left in the dark as to why God would be less than a maximally 
perfect being if my writing this review now caused God to know (from all 
eternity) that I am doing so. It is far from clear that every kind of causal 
dependency is perfection-diminishing. 
Also, we are introduced to the problem of God's immutability (on p. 99) by 
the following argument, "ooa perfect being must be incapable of change. After 
all, change must be for the better or the worse." Nash in effect abandons this 
latter claim later in the chapter; but I submit that it is highly implausible on it's 
face and, hence, not a genuine problem raiser. 
Religion: If there is no God. 00 On God, the Devil, Sin and other Worries of the 
so-called Philosophy of Religion, by Leszek Kolakowski. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1982. $19.95. 
Reviewed by FREDERICK FERRE, University of Georgia. 
This book also exists in a paperback edition available in Great Britain through 
Fontana Paperbacks, presumably for much less than the outrageous cost of the 
hardbound edition. Even at half--or one fourth--of the price, however, these 
contents are not worth recommending for purchase. I am surprised that Oxford 
University Press published the book at all. 
I am particularly surprised that such a distinguished Press allowed the book's 
text to be continually interrupted-sometimes in mid-sentence-with inserts of 
quotations, printed in bold-face type, that mar the appearance ofthe page (making 
each chapter look like an article in some Sunday Supplement magazine) and ruin 
